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Abstract 
 
In the spring of 2016, Azerbaijan undertook a military campaign to conquer Nagorno-
Karabakh. Although the estimated number of casualties, as well as the land taken by Azerbaijan 
differs per source, it is agreed that it is the most violent clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 
the 1994 ceasefire agreement was reached. This thesis will argue what the worsening economy of 
Azerbaijan and the shifts within its domestic political situation have moved Azerbaijan towards this 
escalation of the conflict. Using a state level of analysis, as well as an individual level of analysis, this 
thesis will analyse how the resource curse of Azerbaijan which backfired after the Oil Boom ended, 
combined with the increase in protests from the civilians, has led to the regime deciding to move to 
escalate its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On 2 April 2016, in the early morning, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is situated in 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, experienced more unrest than it had experienced in years. The 
fighting, lasting for four days, was heavier than it had been since 1994. (Jarosiewicz A.)The conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over  the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has been in existence for a 
lot longer than that. What follows is a historical account When the Soviet Union was dissolved, many 
new nation states were created. This did not happen without conflict between various peoples. One 
of these conflicts is found in the South Caucasus, particularly between the republics of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The conflict between these states can be dated back before either of them were named 
the way they are today. In the 2000-year period before Azerbaijan became the state it is today, it has 
undergone several changes in name and leadership. It was first part of Caucasian Albania and was 
later renamed depending on the ruling entity, before it became a part of the Russian Tsarist Empire. 
The region of Arsakh (or Ganja, or Karabakh depending on the source and time period) was one of 
the most important in the wider territory of what is now Azerbaijan. After the occupation by the 
Russians, in the 1830s, Armenians were first relocated due to a treaty between Persia and the 
Russian Empire. A special oblast was created for the Armenian population in 1828 and was later 
dissolved. However, most of Azerbaijan was Christianised by Russia, as well as Armenianised through 
“Provisional Regional Management” which also included the Armenian bishop. Russia’s reasoning for 
relocating Armenians into the South Caucasus was simple; It wanted a Christian periphery on its 
borders with the Muslim world. Georgians were not to be trusted easily and thus the Armenians 
offered refuge. Armenians enjoyed a favourable position in the South Caucasus, as opposed to the 
native tribes and peoples. In the aftermath of the October revolution, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Armenia were officially proclaimed in Tbilisi, however, Azerbaijan had to cede territory to the 
Armenians in order for Armenia to de jure become a state. The Armenian people were granted the 
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Erivan and Echmiadzin districts. In roughly the same years, during the period of British occupation 
and the allied powers of the First World War, the Karabakh region was fully ascribed to Azerbaijan 
due to its geographical location on the Azerbaijani side of the mountains.  Even though the 
Azerbaijani administration was the sole recognised power in Karabakh and its democratic party 
represented all ethnic groups living there, there were still many supporters of the Armenian Dashnak 
government. This, in turn, resulted in many clashes and eventually the failure of resistance against 
the Bolsheviks in 1920. The Azerbaijani troops were forced to fight the Dashnak rebels in Nagorno-
Karabakh instead of protecting the borders with Russia. According to Rau, it is thus clear that before 
and during the short existence of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, the region of Nagorno-
Karabakh was a part of its territory. After this, however, the legislation changed. The issue was that 
all factors, with the except of population, were in favour of Nagorno-Karabakh being a part of 
Azerbaijan. To acknowledge this, Nagorno Karabakh was, as a compromise between the Armenian 
people and the Azerbaijani government, proclaimed an autonomous administrative region of Soviet 
Azerbaijan in 1921. When this was strengthened by a 1923 declaration stating that the Armenians 
could develop their own culture and language and thus had the chance to fully entrench themselves 
in Nagorno Karabakh. Throughout the period of Soviet rule, the autonomous rule of Nagorno-
Karabakh attempted to transfer from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR, being rejected by the 
Soviets in Moscow and Baku continuously. This happened during periods of unrest in the Union, for 
instance during the perestroika and glasnost periods. (Rau 7-36) 
In 1988, the late Soviet period, Nagorno-Karabakh was again under political siege. In 
February of that year, the Supreme Soviet turned down a petition by the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) to be incorporated in the Armenian territory. Armenia responded to this 
by expressing its wish to incorporate the NKAO into its territory, but Azerbaijan rejected these claims 
made by Armenia on the grounds of territorial integrity. In the end, the Supreme Soviet did not 
change the status of the NKAO and even placed special regime and Soviet troops in Nagorno-
Karabakh. These stayed in place until the 1991 declaration of independence by Azerbaijan. After this 
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declaration, Nagorno-Karabakh again attempted to gain independence by declaring itself the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). This declaration only led to Azerbaijan revoking the autonomous 
status that Nagorno-Karabakh had enjoyed for the past decades. When a referendum in 1996 by the 
NKR declared its independence, the last judicial move was made. A new situation arose, where the 
NKR did not only go unrecognised by Azerbaijan, but also by Armenia. After this, all that remained 
was conflict between Azerbaijan and the NKR. Armenia takes the side of the NKR claiming its legal 
independence from Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan does not cease to see it as part of its territory. 
Regular clashes continued to take place between the opposite forces, until a ceasefire agreement 
was reached in 1994. Since then, there have been two noteworthy events of violence, 2008 and 2014 
(Pokalova 72-73) In 2016, there was an upsurge in the conflict. News sources have reported on the 
escalation in April 2016, as well as on the previous two in 2008 and 2014. 
On 5 March 2008, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported on the break of the ceasefire 
around the Nagorno-Karabakh region. According to them, there were 3 fatal casualties. (British 
Broadcasting Company) This death toll is disputed by both sides. Azerbaijan has spoken of 12 
fatalities and 15 wounded. (Today.az) The escalation was most likely a result of the election results in 
Armenia in the month before. Because of these results, the people of Armenia were in protest, which 
had caused the government of Armenia to declare a state of emergency and use police and military 
forces to put an end to the protests. This has lead the Armenian government to claim that Azerbaijan 
used the weakness of Armenia to take back a part of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani authorities 
dispute this claim and present their own version of what happened. Their story revolves around 
Armenia making the first move in order to divert the attention of its people away from the previously 
mentioned election results. (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty) 
In the summer of 2014, on 1 and 2 August, there was another series of clashes. These again 
receive various accounts of what exactly happened, as well as different numbers of casualties from 
different authorities. The difference in this situation is that Nagono-Karabakh had seen an 
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opportunity to declare independence in 2008, as they saw the case of Kosovo gaining independence 
in the eyes of the majority of the international community as a precedent. The number of casualties 
reported differs from 4 Azeri soldiers and only one soldier from Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh, to 9 
Azeri soldiers and one soldier from Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh. The first version was adopted by 
the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, while the second version was told by the Ministry of Defence 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty) In fact, the numbers of that period have 
differed greatly between the two countries, with Armenia stating an amount of 25 casualties on the 
side of Azerbaijan since July 28, when Azerbaijan goes as far as saying 70 Armenians died on the first 
two days of August alone. (Eurasianet.org) 
In the year 2016, with tensions having risen to a higher and higher level, Azerbaijan moves to 
an attack on the forces of Armenia. Starting early in the morning on 2 April and lasting for four days 
until a ceasefire agreement was reached on 5 April, this clash between the two nations is often 
referred to as the “Four-Day war” or “April War”. In reality, both nations accuse one another from 
starting this escalation, “although everything indicates that Azerbaijan took the initiative.” 
(Jarosiewicz) As in the previous two clashes, the number of casualties has been difficult to pinpoint. 
Both sides are reporting 60 military casualties at the least and that number is being fueled by the 
civilian casualties that occurred due to the use of heavy weaponry, including artillery, rocket 
launchers and even tanks. The United States Department of State estimates the total number of 
casualties to 350. (U.S. Department of State) This number would mean that more lives were lost in 
the Four-Day War than there were in the preceding eight years. This escalation is reported to be 
more violent in nature than any before it since 1989. The reported casualties, as well as the arms 
used to fight by both sides support this claim. The question remains, why Azerbaijan escalated its 
conflict with Armenia in 2016? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
After the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning the region 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, there have been only 3 noteworthy events of armed clashes. Given the 
significantly more violent and casualty heavy nature of the most recent event, it is important to 
establish the motives for this escalation. By extracting the motives of Azerbaijan for their escalation 
of the conflict, the temporal element will also be covered. This being the explanation of not only why 
Azerbaijan acted the way it did, but also why Azerbaijan acted the way it did at that specific moment 
in time. This leads to the research question: Why did Azerbaijan escalate its conflict with Armenia in 
2016? 
In this respect, there is one particular hypothesis by Carlson that offers a foundation for 
further research. Her hypothesis “states that as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances 
increases, there is an increase in the probability that the lower cost tolerant (LCT) actor achieves his 
or her maximum level of escalation at the outset of the conflict.” (Carlson 512) This hypothesis 
assumes a mainly economic reasoning behind conflict escalation. In essence, Carlson hypothesises 
that, when two countries are in conflict, the country that experiences less economic growth or more 
economic decline will let the conflict escalate. This thesis makes use of the research of Carlson and 
Goldsmith to test the hypothesis that the economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the period before 
the conflict between the nations escalated and hence this declining economy was one of the deciding 
factors in Azerbaijan escalating its conflict with Armenia. Goldsmith has gone further to research the 
effects of trade on conflict. He argues that when a party has enough resources to bear the costs of 
conflict without damaging its trade volume, it will have the upper hand in the pre-escalation phase. 
In his research he tests four hypotheses that assume the positive and negative effects of trade 
interdependence and volume on the onset and escalation of a conflict. (Goldsmith 560-61) Goldsmith 
does not go into detail when it comes to one of two parties in a conflict being economically deprived 
or weakened. His research does however support the claims of Carlson that when the cost tolerances 
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of two parties in a conflict are too far apart, the party that performs the least will seek escalation of 
the conflict. With this research it is possible to argue economic downturn to be a plausible motive for 
Azerbaijan to opt for conflict escalation. For this reason, this thesis will test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the period before it escalated 
its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. 
To further elaborate on the economic situation of Azerbaijan, Dutch disease and the Rentier 
State theory come into the fold. Hasanov gives four characteristics of Dutch disease which he uses to 
identify it in a case study. “(1) decline in manufacturing growth, reflecting both direct and indirect 
de-industrialization; (2) faster growth in the non-tradable sector; (3) surge in overall wage level and 
(4) real exchange rate appreciation, due to an increased relative price of non-tradable 
sector.”(Hasanov 467)  
Further research has pinpointed another area to explore when discussion conflict escalation. 
The research of Wright and Diehl is of help when trying to understand why the conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia is escalating at all. Wright and Diehl attempt to convince their readers of 
multiple factors that make it more likely to let a territorial dispute escalate into war or other violence 
between states. They summarise and build upon the works of Tir and Vasquez, Hensel, Chan, 
Lektzian and Souva, and more, to continue their efforts to form a more universal theory and fill the 
gaps that they believe still exist in the findings of their predecessors. Wright and Diehl, like their 
sources, state that territorial disputes are more likely to escalate into war than any other type of 
dispute. This is a statement that definitely applies to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
They pay particular attention to the idea of outbidding. This describes the situation where the 
citizens of a country agree on the enemy, but do not see eye to eye as to how to deal with the 
situation. The other theory that they advocate is the selectorate theory. Wright and Diehl explain this 
as “a progressive theory of international and domestic politics that purports to explain the 
democratic peace as well as a series of domestic political behavio[u]rs.” (Wright and Diehl 649) They 
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further elaborate on this by stating that a democracy will always need to be consistent in its actions 
and justify them by pointing out their use for the public good. An autocracy, on the other hand, 
merely needs to keep their small elites content and therefore only concerns itself with the 
distribution of private goods in order to stay in office. When it then comes to outbidding, the claim is 
that it is not the public that will be divided, but the elite that is after its own private interests. After 
the explanation of the difference between an autocracy and a so-called strongman state, which is an 
autocracy lead by a clear personality, it can be concluded that both Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
generally classified as strongman states. Wright and Diehl conclude with another three notable 
findings which they see as worthy of further research. They assume that when a stalemate occurs, it 
will only increase the rivalry between dyads as time progresses. Democracies will have longer 
conflicts, whereas autocracies are more prone to take risks. This is because democracies have their 
eye on the public good and taking risks will not show their interest in this area. Autocracies do not 
have to worry about this and can take risks, they are thus also more likely to let the conflict escalate 
into violence. A theory that has come to life in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia. (Wright and Diehl 
649-664)  This research of Wright and Diehl has opened up the possibility to test a second hypothesis 
through which it is possible to answer the research question of this thesis. The testing of this 
hypothesis covers the developments in the domestic politics of Azerbaijan. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The political situation in Azerbaijan was increasingly unstable in the period 
it escalated its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. 
The ruling elite in Azerbaijan has used its business to practice politics. According to Heinrich 
and Pleines, the ruling elite “clearly perceive themselves as actors who determine the fate of their 
countries and not merely as objects in an international power struggle.” (Heinrich and Pleines 108) 
On the other hand, as Wright and Diehl are arguing, the elites of Azerbaijan would merely be 
concerned with the preservation and increase of their power and resources. These theories put 
forward by this article are helpful in determining whether the escalation of the conflict between 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan in the spring of 2016 was predictable or can at the very least be explained. 
Radnitz describes the way in which the Aliev regime has taken power and his work, together with 
that of Kendall-Taylor, also describes how the regime has been able to keep it. Sultanova takes on 
the other perspective and discusses the way in which opposition in Azerbaijan has existed and 
developed since 1991, which is added to by Bedford to discuss the latest years of political 
mobilization in Azerbaijan. These last years, which is also the period leading up to the escalation of 
the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, will be more elaborated on using various news 
sources. This thesis will attempt to minimise bias from these sources by using the accounts of 
multiple. Furthermore, it will solely rely on the reports on events and not the reports on opinions or 
statements. However, as the author is not in any position to read Azerbaijani or Russian sources, or 
any source other than English ones, it is possible that the Western account of events will have an 
upper hand. 
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Chapter 3: Method & Methodology 
 
In order to answer the question why Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with Armenia in early 
2016, the first distinction that needs to be made is between the internal and external factors that can 
be researched in this context. Scholars like Wright and Diehl focus on the internal or domestic factors 
that cause conflict escalation. They pay particular attention to public opinion in relation to different 
systems of government. According to them and the authors they reference, the combination of these 
two factors are of vital importance to understanding conflict escalation. Wright and Diehl are 
advocates of researching the domestic to explain the transnational. On the other side of the 
spectrum, there are those that argue for the research of external factors. Smith Stegen and Kusznir 
discuss the external relations between nations based on economics. They then link the development 
in the world economy to the political relations of countries. This is mostly based on the changes in 
the oil market. (Smith Stegen and Kusznir 91-103) The premise of the thesis is that Azerbaijan 
escalated the conflict with Armenia. For this reason, it is necessary to look at Azerbaijan rather than 
Armenia to find out what may have been the reasoning behind the escalation. The move to 
escalation has been an internal decision within Azerbaijan, which has had an external effect onto 
Armenia. Therefore, it is most helpful to start looking at the internal to see what changed that made 
it necessary to include the external. This does mean it is important to recognise the different possible 
levels of analysis. This thesis will focus on researching the domestic factors of Azerbaijan, the state 
level of analysis. Moreover, when discussing the inner changer within the regime of Azerbaijan, it will 
look at the individual level of analysis. It would be possible to discuss the sub-state level or the 
systemic level as well. However, with the question at hand, which asks for the reasoning of 
Azerbaijan behind the escalation of its conflict with Armenia, it is outside the scope of this question 
to include a sub-state, or even global level of analysis. The way Azerbaijan is functioning and the 
changes that have occurred within its own borders are more likely to have caused a change in 
behaviour than the changes that have occurred outside of their territory. It is not the case that a 
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domestic approach will exclude external influences. When a domestic factor is researched in this 
thesis, the external influenced on that particular factor will also be taken into account. The approach 
chosen can further be explained by the topic that is researched.  
It is possible to look at several domestic factors within a country. The main four factors that 
are addressed in scholarly literature are the economy, politics, culture and society of a country. The 
last two factors are easily confused with each other. In this context, the definition of the Cambridge 
Dictionary will be used, this states that culture is “the way of life, especially the general customs and 
beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time.” (Cambridge Dictionary) “Society 
describes a large group of people who live together in an organized way, making decisions about how 
to do things and sharing the work that needs to be done.” (Cambridge Dictionary) In the case of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, culture and society are important factors to take into account. However, 
this thesis does not concern itself with the nature of the conflict, but merely with the motivation of 
Azerbaijan to get the conflict to escalate at the particular moment in time that they did. In this 
respect, the only domestic factors that can be considered to be important are those that have to do 
with the economy and the politics of Azerbaijan. This thesis will discuss two domestic factors that it 
hypothesises to have caused Azerbaijan to again escalate the conflict with Armenia. These factors are 
the economy of Azerbaijan and the domestic politics of Azerbaijan. Concerning the economy, this 
thesis will address the nature of the resource curse which it has endured since the discovery of its oil 
and the way this has affected the economy when the Oil Boom ended. Domestic politics in this thesis 
are defined as the political activity that occurs within the border of a country, regarding the regime 
and its relation to civil society. When discussing the domestic politics of Azerbaijan, this thesis will 
focus on the developments within the standing regime as well as the development of civil society in 
relation to it. This means that while the analysis of the economy will take place on a state level, the 
analysis of the domestic politics of Azerbaijan will take place on both the individual as well as the 
state level. There are other factors that could have contributed to Azerbaijan moving to escalation of 
the conflict. These factors will not be discussed in the further thesis, but they will be addressed here 
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to show their significance for future research. In the context of Azerbaijan, it is important to take into 
account the geographical element. It is a bridge between different parts of the world economy and 
as such there is often a lot of stress put on the region surrounding it. The relations that Azerbaijan 
upholds with surrounding countries and others are therefore very interesting to review. However, 
the international relations surrounding Azerbaijan would draw away so much attention from the 
domestic factors that they cannot be discussed in this particular thesis. It is possible that future 
research conducted on this would reveal that the external relations of Azerbaijan and their influence 
have had a greater impact on the decision-making that eventually led to the escalation of the conflict 
with Armenia in 2016. Nonetheless this thesis is focussing on the domestic factors of Azerbaijan and 
the effect they have had on the decision-making of Azerbaijan. To elaborate further on the methods 
used in this thesis, the research question is answered through the testing of two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the period before it escalated 
its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The political situation in Azerbaijan was increasingly unstable in the period 
it escalated its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. 
Before H1 can be tested, an understanding of the economy of Azerbaijan is needed. It is widely 
accepted by the scholars that have been consulted for this thesis, such as Hasanov, Rasizade and 
Alper, that the economy of Azerbaijan can be characterised to suffer from a resource curse. A 
resource curse is generally defined as the situation in which a state with more natural resources 
experiences less democracy, economic growth and economic development than a state with less 
natural resources. The concept was first proposed by Sachs and Warner. Scholars such as Alper and 
Hasanov have researched the concept of the resource curse to affirm its premises. There are several 
ways to establish this. This thesis will use the concepts of Dutch Disease and Rentier State Theory to 
argue that Azerbaijan is suffering from a resource curse. The Dutch disease theory argues for the 
decrease of one economic sector when another increases. Usually these two sectors are tradable 
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sectors and the increasing one is usually involving natural resources, which is the case in Azerbaijan. 
It is, however, not by definition the case that Dutch disease only occurs in countries with a rich 
natural resource sector. This thesis will follow the method of Hasanov to identify whether or not 
Azerbaijan suffers from Dutch disease and, if so, to what degree. To show the trends in the economy 
of Azerbaijan that identify whether or not Azerbaijan suffers from Dutch Disease, this thesis will rely 
on data from several sources. The sources that have been consulted are the Trading Economics 
Indicators, Quandl Collections, World Bank Data, UN Data and The State Statistical Committee of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. These sources will also be applied when discussing the rentier state theory in 
relation to Azerbaijan. This theory is more focused at the effects a resource curse has on the political 
situation of the country, whereas the Dutch disease research focuses on the implications for the 
economy. The rentier state theory describes a state that receives most of its income from resource 
based rents. In such a state, the political economy, democracy level, economic growth and security 
matters are, according to rentier state theory, linked and the effects of the political economy are felt 
further in the politics of the country as well as its economic performance. As previously explained, 
the rentier state theory focuses on the political effects of a resource curse, whereas the Dutch 
disease theory focuses on the effects on the economy of a state. Thus, these two theories 
complement each other and they are exactly what is needed for the first hypothesis. Their 
explanation of the economic situation of Azerbaijan contributes to the gathering of data to use for 
testing this hypothesis. When H1 is not disproved by the findings that arise from analysing the works 
of Hasanov, Alper and the data gathered, it is possible to conclude that Azerbaijan escalated its 
conflict with Armenia because its economy was declining. In the period leading up to it. 
The second hypothesis, which states that the political situation in Azerbaijan was increasingly 
unstable in the period before the conflict between the nations escalated, is based on the research of 
Wright and Diehl, as well as that of Heinrich and Pleines. Especially the selectorate theory and the 
concept of outbidding are of relevance to H2. The hypothesis will be tested using the methods 
proposed by Radnitz, Kendall-Taylor, Bedford and Sultanova. Each brings their own addition to the 
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research done for this thesis. Radnitz focuses on the rise of the Aliyev regime and follows its rise to 
power whilst focussing on the elite, instead of civil society. This method is most suited to Azerbaijan 
as the state has, according to Radnitz, experienced more resistance from within its own ranks than 
from the citizens it governs. (Radnitz 64-65) Since Radnitz wrote his research over a decade ago, 
there have been changes, however slight in the political situation within the borders of Azerbaijan. 
Bedford has aptly chosen to review the protests on 12 January 2013 to challenge the point of view 
that the elite of Azerbaijan only challenge each other, while civil society does nothing to challenge 
them. Her approach and method are different in the respect that her level of analysis is beyond the 
regime itself and includes civil society to indicate a shift in the political situation of the country. This 
is reinforced with the work of Sultanova who takes a further step and looks at a wider timeline of 
political opposition rather than a single event. Using these three levels of analysis, together with 
more recent news sources, it is possible to link their conclusions to the research of Heinrich, Wright 
and Diehl. He reviews the decision-making of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the development of their 
National Security Concepts. These were meant to reintegrate the territory that they had lost after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The development in the reintegration policy, disguised as a 
national security policy, is meant not only to send messages to the international community, but can 
also be used to convince civil society of an external enemy rather than the regime. This again links 
back to the words of Wright and Diehl who state that autocratic regimes risk conflict escalation in 
order to divert the attention of its subjects away from itself and towards an external enemy. The 
conclusion of the analysis of the political situation in Azerbaijan on three levels in relation to the 
selectorate theory and the concept of outbidding will give ample results to either disprove or not 
disprove H2. The three levels are the regime itself, the regime in relation to civil society within the 
boundaries of a specific event and the regime in relation to civil society during most of their 
existence. When H2 is not disproved by the analysis of the abovementioned research, it is possible to 
conclude that Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with Armenia because political situation was becoming 
increasingly unstable in the period leading up to it. 
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When the two hypotheses have been tested, the results can be combined to answer the research 
question of this thesis. This question is why did Azerbaijan escalate its conflict with Armenia in 2016? 
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Chapter 4: Economic Spiral 
 
In order to test the first hypothesis that the economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the 
period before it escalated its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. It is needed to analyse the economy 
of Azerbaijan. In this chapter, the economy of Azerbaijan will thus be described and analysed in order 
to be able to conclude whether or not the first hypothesis is plausible. To do this, the resource curse 
theory will be applied. To see the effects of the resource curse on Azerbaijan, this chapter will draw 
on both the Dutch disease concept and the rentier state theory. In order to accurately analyse the 
situation of Azerbaijan through these concepts, the thesis will use data from various sources. This will 
achieve an understanding of the economic as well as the political effects of the resource curse. When 
this is completed, this chapter will move on to use the latest data to show to what degree the 
economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the period before Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with 
Armenia. 
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Dutch disease 
In order to be able to identify the state of the economy of Azerbaijan to the end of testing 
H1, this thesis will draw on the works of Hasanov, combined with various data sources. Hasanov 
proposes to identify it as a country that is suffering from Dutch disease. The concept of Dutch disease 
is described as follows.  
 
“appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate, caused by the sharp rise in exports, and the 
tendency of a booming resource sector to draw capital and labor away from a country’s 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The subsequent dynamic leads to a decline in exports of 
agricultural and manufactured goods and inflate the cost of non-tradable goods.” (Hasanov 464)  
 
This means that when a country has a lot of natural resources which are in high demand with 
foreign buyers, this country will at a certain time decide to start exporting an exponentially larger 
amount of these resources, making the country its currency increase in value in comparison with 
other currencies. When looking at Azerbaijan between 2000 and 2007, this is indeed the case. Their 
resource exports were rising significantly since 2000 and their currency thus also deflated. (The State 
Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan) Since the natural resource sector is then rapidly 
growing, the demand for capital and labour will be greater than it is in other sectors and it will thus 
take away capital and labour from the other sectors in the economy. Eventually this leads to a 
decreasing export trend in all other sectors of the economy and an increase in the costs of non-
tradable goods. Azerbaijan is, according to Hasanov, heavily dependent on its natural resources. He 
explains that the investments, both domestic and foreign, are mostly done to improve and enlarge 
that part of the national economy. Hasanov divides the economy in three sectors, the oil sector, the 
non-oil tradable sector and the non-tradable sector. By testing four “symptoms” in the case of 
Azerbaijan, Hasanov can establish to what extent Azerbaijan is suffering from Dutch disease. These 
four symptoms are: “(1) decline in manufacturing growth, reflecting both direct and indirect de-
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industrialization; (2) faster growth in the non-tradable sector; (3) surge in overall wage level and (4) 
real exchange rate appreciation, due to an increased relative price of non-tradable sector.”(Hasanov 
467) By examining these four symptoms, Hasanov concludes that Azerbaijan has not experienced 
“absolute de-industrialization”, but “relative de-industrialisation” of the non-oil tradable sector, as 
well as substantial expansion in the non-tradable sector. This could be explained by the Dutch 
Disease theory, since non-oil production sectors experienced de-industrialisation while the non-
tradable sector grew. However, the employment in the oil sector did not increase. On the other 
hand, there has been a significant influx of capital into the non-tradable sector which was made 
possible by the oil revenues. Hasanov shows this is correct by linking the real oil price directly to the 
real exchange rate of Azerbaijan. This was true for the years 2000 to 2007. However, when looking at 
statistics from the World Bank used by Trading Economics, the real exchange rate had, since the end 
of 2015, more than doubled in early 2016. (Trading Economics) The timing of this is parallel to that of 
the drop in oil prices. (Trading Economics) What is problematic for Azerbaijan, according to Hasanov, 
is that the foreign investments into the oil sector have redirected the focus to this sector and this has 
made for a decrease in exports from other tradable sectors. This has led Azerbaijan right onto the 
path of being a resource driven economy. (Hasanov 463-475) 
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Rentier state 
After discussing the Dutch disease theory in relation to Azerbaijan, this thesis will now 
discuss the rentier state theory. The theory also addresses the fact that Azerbaijan gains most of its 
revenues from its natural resource sector. Which is confirmed by data from The State Statistical 
Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan) The difference with the Dutch disease concept is that rentier state theory is more 
focused on the political implications of a resource curse, rather than the economic implications. A 
rentier state is described as a state where revenues come mostly in the form of rents from a natural 
resource sector in the economy. It further aims to establish a link between such a political economy 
and democracy, economic growth and security matters of state. Almaz uses the rentier state theory 
to argue that the political economy created by natural resource revenues in Azerbaijan hinders 
democracy. A point that will be strengthened by Radnitz and Kendall-Taylor in chapter 5. He 
concludes by claiming that Azerbaijan fits within the theoretical framework of a rentier state. The 
fact that citizens are not taxed, but that the government relies on its energy revenues instead is 
counterproductive to the cause of democratisation. Azerbaijan does tax its citizens, however the 
level of taxes has dropped since 2010. (The World Bank) The entire state system is also corrupted 
because of this, because the authorities are not provided with the proper resources due to lack of 
taxes. According to Transparency International, Azerbaijan is one of the more corrupt countries that 
they have monitored. In their 2015 index ranking, they put Azerbaijan at 119 out of 168. 
(Transparency International) Besides this, the regime supresses any opposition and reinforces its 
authority by supporting the societal groups that strengthen its grip on the nation. Lastly, Almaz 
shows the significant amount of the Azerbaijan GDP that is being spent on national security, which is 
especially aimed at the infrastructure around the natural resources that pay for most everything that 
goes on in the country. (Almaz 59-67) 
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End of the Oil Boom 
Seeing as Azerbaijan has been suffering from a resource curse, as Azerbaijan can be 
described as both suffering from Dutch disease, as well as being a rentier state, this thesis will now 
move on to discuss the developments in the economy of Azerbaijan over the recent years that have 
led to economic deterioration. In doing so, it will test H1 that the economy of Azerbaijan was 
declining in the period leading up to it escalating its conflict with Armenia in 2016.  
 When looking at the economic performance of Azerbaijan in the period of 2013 to early 
2016, there are several trends that stand out. First of all, there was a drop in government budget. 
(Trading Economics) This can be explained by the fall of the oil prices throughout 2015 which did not 
see an end until well into the year 2016. (Trading Economics) On the other hand, the government did 
spend more and more every year on their military. Their spending more than doubled between 2012 
and 2016. (Trading Economics) Furthermore, to stop their own currency from inflating after the fall in 
the oil prices, Azerbaijan all but depleted its foreign exchange reserves between late 2014 and early 
2016. (Trading Economics) The inflation rate was not completely contained as it rose by 300% 
between the last months of 2015 and January of 2016. (Quandl) (Trading Economics) All of these 
factors are reflected into the GDP of Azerbaijan. The GDP, as well as its growth saw a rise until 2015, 
but then dropped down with a very negative growth in 2015 up to early 2016. (Trading Economics) 
(Quandl) (The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan ) This means that by all 
accounts, the economy of Azerbaijan was declining in the period leading up to it escalating its conflict 
with Armenia in 2016. Thus, H1 holds. This means that a part of the answer to the question why 
Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with Armenia in April 2016 is answered. This thesis will move on to 
test H2 that the political situation in Azerbaijan was increasingly unstable in the period before it 
escalated its conflict with Armenia.  
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Chapter 5: Domestic Politics 
In this chapter, hypothesis 2 will be addressed. This states that the political situation in 
Azerbaijan was increasingly unstable in the period before it escalated its conflict with Armenia. To 
test this hypothesis, it is first necessary to address how the regime in Azerbaijan was formed and 
how it stayed in power. To do so, this thesis will draw on the works of Radnitz and Kendall-Taylor, 
who discuss the rise of the Aliyev regime and explain how it has survived. This will cover the 
individual level of analysis. Next, to look at the way civil society has functioned under this regime, or 
rather how it has turned itself against the regime, this chapter will follow the works of Sultanova and 
Bedford. They respectively elaborate on protests in Azerbaijan from 1991 onwards, and the specific 
protests that took place in January 2013 and their aftermath. This section will cover the state level of 
analysis. When there is a better understanding of the developments in the domestic politics of 
Azerbaijan, The chapter will discuss the way these developments have eventually led to the regime 
of Azerbaijan escalating the conflict with Armenia. It will do so through the use of Heinrich, Wright 
and Diehl and their theory on outbidding and their selectorate theory. When these three processes 
have been completed, this chapter will be able to conclude whether or not H2 is disproved, to the 
end of answering the question why Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with Armenia in 2016. 
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Establishment of the regime and its survivability 
To examine the developments in the political situation of Azerbaijan, this thesis will first 
establish what regime was like and how it rose to power. To do so, it will look at the works of Radnitz 
and Kendall-Taylor. Radnitz explains the way that the Aliyev regime took power. He then argues that 
the regime in Azerbaijan could stay in place because the opposition, in contrast with the colour 
revolution cases, came from within its own ranks. This, combined with the absence of Western 
support to the outside opposition of the regime, made for a situation in which the ruling elite had no 
trouble staying in power. Radnitz does argue on the other hand that this might not have been the 
case, had Azerbaijan not been a country with an abundance of natural resources. This is supported 
by the research of Kendall-Taylor. Who shows that the ruling elite in oil-rich countries, to remain in 
control, the president had to be surrounded by a ruling elite that supported his leadership. In order 
to do so, Hayder Aliyev made them all materially benefit from his presidency. This way he made it 
their interest to protect their material gains through supporting a non-democratic government and 
advocating that there was no need for economic reforms. When Aliyev and his supporters gained 
control, they made some reforms to the economy, however, they also reintegrated a large part of 
the economy under the state. Privatisation was stumped by the concentration of growth in the oil 
sector. A substantial amount of the revenues gained from the oil sector was at the disposal of the 
regime. This resulted in more patronage in order to reaffirm the political position of Aliyev and his 
regime. At the same time, the booming oil sector gave room for a middle class society that was prone 
to keep the system as it was intact, for their own personal interest. A pro-democratic uprising by 
society was thus not imminent. The issue with decreasing privatisation meant that those who were 
previously wealthy outside of the regime could not protect their assets without supporting the 
regime. This resulted in the labelling of such elites as threats and some were even exiled. The last 
benefit that Azerbaijan had from its oil was the lack of opposition support from the West. Their oil 
was so important to Europe that if the country was to fall into a political crisis, this might jeopardise 
the oil exports from Azerbaijan. Although the people of Azerbaijan have started to lose faith in their 
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regime, a real uprising did not happen until after 2010. The regime controls the main media sources 
and possesses the means to silence or bribe their main opposition because of the oil revenues. 
Radnitz stresses the importance of the factors described as these were the factors missing from the 
same situation in Georgia, where a colour revolution did take place. (Radnitz 60-72) (Kendall-Taylor 
737-758) The interesting times when the regime had possible issues with opposition parties, were 
during an election year. In these times, the international community was paying close attention, 
which ensured the opposition got space and means to spread its message. However, next to state 
media, the opposition did not have access to any other forms of communication besides printing. 
This meant that through privatised media, mainly television and radio, citizens of Azerbaijan heard 
much more of the campaign from the Aliyev camp than from any other party. Furthermore, Kendall-
Taylor explains the ways in which the regime was able to use the enormous profits from oil 
production during these election periods. The ruling elite had a particular interest in staying in 
power. Both Wright and Diehl and Kendall-Taylor acknowledge this. (Wright and Diehl 650) (Kendall-
Taylor 741) Their financially beneficial status came from the current regime and thus they wanted to 
keep it in place in order to keep reaping what they had sowed. It is hypothesised by Kendall-Taylor 
that: “Elections in oil-abundant countries will be preceded by expenditure increases rather than 
revenue reductions.” (Kendall-Taylor 743) When looking at government expenditures before the last 
3 presidential elections in Azerbaijan, which were in 2003, 2008 and 2013, it is visible that what she 
poses is indeed the case. (Trading Economics) (Quandl) (Kendall-Taylor 737-758) Both Radnitz and 
Kendall-Taylor thus show ways in which both the Aliyev regimes have been able to survive and 
remain unchallenged. “The Aliyev regime controls the instruments of coercion, the media and the 
revenues from oil with which to buy off potential rivals.” (Radnitz 71) Besides this, the regime has 
tampered with the elections since 1995, ensuring their victory. (Radnitz 70) Nevertheless, there has 
been opposition to the regime which has attempted to challenge its rule. It is possible that this 
opposition has eventually contributed to the destabilising of the political situation in Azerbaijan, 
which is, according to H2 a reason for Azerbaijan escalating its conflict with Armenia in April 2016. 
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Opposition to the regime 
 
Now that the forming and survivability of the regime have been laid out, this thesis will move 
on to review the developments that have taken place regarding any opposition from civil society to 
the regime of Azerbaijan. For this purpose, Sultanova and Bedford will be consulted. Particular 
attention will we paid to the January 2013 protests and their aftermath. When that has been 
completed, this section will discuss the most recent protests in Azerbaijan, in order to show 
correlation between these protests and the decision making of the regime of Azerbaijan to move to 
escalate its conflict with Armenia in 2016. This is done to the end of testing H2 that the political 
situation in Azerbaijan was becoming increasingly unstable in the period leading up the escalation of 
its conflict with Armenia. If H2 holds, it will become possible to answer the question why Azerbaijan 
escalated its conflict with Armenia in 2016.  
When talking about the opposition in Azerbaijan, Sultanova stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between the old and the new oppositions. Amongst these oppositions was the 
Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF). A movement made up of educated and uneducated citizens who 
were mostly motivated by nationalism and who fought against the rule of the Soviets. This 
movement became active in the last years of Soviet Azerbaijan, when the Kremlin allowed citizens to 
question their leaders. Through the success of the APF, Azerbaijan got more and more autonomy and 
could eventually, in 1991, declare its independence. Despite their progressive and liberal style of 
governing, the APF was very unorganised. Due to this unorganised structure and some disloyalty 
amongst commanders, the military forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could not being 
controlled properly. Thus, Azerbaijan lost the war with Armenia over the region. When the 
presidential representative of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh then overthrew the APF in June 1993, 
it was unable to stop him and Heydar Aliyev came into power. (Sultanova 15-18) From the moment 
when the first elections in Azerbaijan took place, the opposition parties to the Aliyev regime, which 
consisted of two parties, the APF and the Musavat parties, did not have a lot of tools to work with. 
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They were particularly watchful of political prosecution. Especially the APF was heavily attacked and 
had is headquarters occupied for several years. The opposition rallies and protests were almost all 
being shut down in Baku when Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003. The opposition parties did not 
encourage violence, but rather peaceful protests. It was mostly during the election years that the 
opposition could spread its messages and really campaign against the regime. They did not go 
unchallenged by the Aliyev regimes. The opposition did get access to broadcasts on state television 
and radio, but they had no other means of media, besides paper printing, to run their campaign on. 
The Aliyev regime however, has had control of all forms of media since they rose to power. This 
meant that the larger public mostly saw the campaign messages of the ruling party. The opposition 
has shown especially active resistance against the election of Ilham Aliyev, the son of Hayder Aliyev. 
In 2003, when it was announced that he had won the first round of elections, opposition activists 
gathered and protested this result. They were violently dispersed by riot police and military soldiers, 
who had been deployed pre-emptively. It was one of the more violent clashes between the 
opposition and the regime in the history of Azerbaijan. Hundreds of protesters were arrested and 
after this, the regime kept on propagating through the media. In the 2005 elections, a similar event 
took place, where protests broke out, but were quickly put to rest by the use of force. (Sultanova 21-
24) It was after the failure of the opposition to make a change and keep an active and united front 
when an election period had ended, that younger and newer opposition groups were founded. Most 
of them had supported the ideals of the existing opposition, but had lost faith in the execution of 
these ideals. During the mid-2000s, the three most popular new groups were the Dagha youth 
movement, AN network and OI movement. Dagha made a name with bold protests and many of their 
members were arrested because of it, or had a difficult time at university. This was different for the 
AN network, which consisted of Western university graduates and aimed to educate the population 
of Azerbaijan. They built their success with the internet, using public social media pages to spread 
their messages. The essence of their movement was connecting the Azerbaijani students that had 
been educated in the western countries with the local youth. This network was disconnected by the 
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regime of Azerbaijan. It did, however, give way to new, young opinion leaders in Azerbaijan. The 
same can be said for the Ol movement, who, with help of Western funding, established the Free 
Thought University, or, in Azeri, Azad Fikir Universiteti (AFU). The goal of the AFU was to educate the 
people of Azerbaijan in Western values, such as democracy, human rights and liberalism. The AFU 
educated mostly the youth of Azerbaijan through an alternative education programme. In 2013 they 
were shut down by the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. These three movements were not about 
challenging the regime, but about educating the population and develop civil society so it would be 
ready when change did come. When the 2010 parliamentary elections had passed, three new groups 
emerged. Positive Change, Free Youth and N!DA all aspired to do the same as their three 
predecessors. They sought to educate to induce change. None of the six groups actually wanted to 
govern Azerbaijan, but they all wanted to bring about change by spreading the messages of 
democracy and freedom. In contrast with these six groups, Republican Alternative, or ReAL, did, and 
still does, aspire to govern. Their aim is to form a parliamentary republic, which is a difference from 
the other opposition movements, as they are looking to move away from a republican model. 
Another key difference is the age of the founders of the movement. Whereas the previous six 
movements all contained founders who were under the age of 30 when they began their 
oppositions, ReAl was looking at an average age of around 40 amongst its founders. This also helped 
with gaining credibility. They touch upon a larger group of supporters as they do not only appeal to 
the young and the poor, but also to the financially stable and older middle class. This became 
apparent in the 2013 elections, when ReAl did not join the National Council, a union of oppositions. 
Their leader was prosecuted and was therefore denied the right to run as the candidate for ReAl, 
which thus saw the opportunity not to win the elections, but to spread its name and message 
through their campaign. This did not go as well as hoped, as the AFP and Musavat have created their 
name as the general opposition of Azerbaijan. ReAl has thus far gone unrecognised as a valid 
alternative to these two parties. The issue there is that ReAl does not want to be associated with the 
traditional opposition parties, it wants to establish itself as a new opposition party with innovative 
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visions. The traditional opposition cannot succeed in their eyes, because they only fight the regime in 
the political arena, which is a fight that the regime will always win. Whereas it is more difficult for the 
regime to keep the opposition from reaching civil society with their message. (Sultanova 27-34) It 
remains to be seen whether the new opposition movements will eventually succeed in their apolitical 
quest for change. It is clear though, that the traditional opposition will not succeed with the strategy 
they are currently employing. What is interesting, is the challenging of the regime that has taken 
place in recent years. Starting in 2013, there were a lot of heavy protests that had initially little to do 
with political ambition. Bedford has researched the protests of January 2013 and those that have 
followed them to show how the opposition in Azerbaijan has become more active during that 
particular election year. According to Bedford, when she talks about the protests in 2013, “some 
analysts and activists described these events as the beginning of an “Azerbaijani Spring.”” (Bedford 4) 
According to her, these protests and their increase in number had mostly to do with the shift within 
the opposition, which experienced new and younger leaders coming in. Whereas many protests were 
addressing democratic ideals, some were focussing on the economic issues facing Azerbaijan. Both of 
these groups were stating their dissatisfaction with the regime. The protests were somewhat 
successful at first, but were quickly and forcefully shut down by the police and military. Which has 
put an end to the “Azerbaijani Spring” before it had a chance to thaw the winter. Nevertheless, these 
protests and the opposition that has existed for over twenty years, show that there is a significant 
part of Azerbaijan that is motivated to be politically active. As has been described by Sultanova, the 
actors of the opposition have changed and developed into a more impactful group in civil society. 
(Bedford 2-4) This meant that the outcome of protesting was a different story in the beginning of 
2016. Three years after the beginning of the “Azerbaijani Spring”, the authorities in Azerbaijan were 
called on to handle a new wave of protests. In the second week of January, there were upsurges in 
several cities. These protests addressed the economic state Azerbaijan was in. The basic tools for 
living, such as bread and flour, had been steeply rising in price because of the failing economy in 
Azerbaijan. Due to the falling oil price and therefore revenues, in combination with the drop in value 
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of the national currency (the manat), had hit the citizens on Azerbaijan with inflation and 
unemployment. (Trading Economics) (Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan) In return, the 
government of Azerbaijan cut the taxes on food essentials, this and brute force by the authorities 
were meant to stop the protests. (The Guardian) After these protests, the inflation of food prices did 
drop. After an inflation rate of 18,27% in January 2016, it decreased to 9,6% in April. In fact, when 
looking at the inflation rate of food prices, it has been steadily going up since January 2015. (Trading 
Economics) Combining the increased inflation on food with a falling Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and a decreasing Gross National Income (GNI) per capita since 2014, it is not surprising that these 
protests broke out. (The World Bank) It is thus clear that the political situation in Azerbaijan was 
becoming increasingly unstable in the period leading up the escalation of its conflict with Armenia. 
This means that H2 holds. The question in this matter is whether or not these protests and the 
political unrest that they highlighted were a cause for the regime of Azerbaijan to move to escalation 
of its conflict with Azerbaijan. Wright and Diehl show that in this situation, with a deteriorating 
economy and a riled up opposition, the regime of Azerbaijan would undoubtedly move towards 
escalation of the conflict, as they want to create a common enemy for the regime as well as the 
citizens of Azerbaijan. This would distract the public from the issues facing the nation.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 In conclusion, it is visible that, when reading the above, the hypotheses tested by this thesis 
have not been disproved. Although Azerbaijan does not fully suffer from Dutch disease according to 
the methods of Hasanov, it does show symptoms. The economy was growing because of a rise in 
exports and the revenues were used to expand in the non-tradable sector. With the research of 
Almaz, the characteristics of a rentier state are ascribed to Azerbaijan, as it does not rely on taxes, 
which leads to widespread corruption. This means that the Republic of Azerbaijan does suffer from a 
resource curse. With the end of the Oil Boom Azerbaijan only held on to their economy until the fall 
in the oil prices occurred in 2015. This lead to inflation of their currency and a depletion of their 
foreign exchange reserves. Overall it is most visible what the impact of this period was when looking 
at the trends in GDP growth, which show negative growth from 2014 onward. It is thus abundantly 
clear that the economy in Azerbaijan was declining in the period leading up to the escalation of the 
conflict with Armenia. H1 is thus not disproved. This declining economy had also led to the increased 
activity within civil society. The regime used force to put an end to these protests time and time 
again and, with their media control and election manipulation has managed to stay in power. 
Whereas protests were previously happening during election periods, protests became more 
frequent when the economy of Azerbaijan declined. Now, the citizens and the opposition did not 
only have the political situation in Azerbaijan to protests, but also the management of the economy 
by this regime. Hence, the political situation within Azerbaijan was increasingly unstable in the period 
leading up the escalation of the conflict with Armenia. This shows that H2 is not disproved. The 
research question of this thesis; why did Azerbaijan escalate its conflict with Armenia in 2016, is thus 
possible to be answered. Azerbaijan escalated its conflict with Armenia in 2016 because it had a 
declining economy and an increasingly unstable political situation. The regime needed to draw the 
focus of the public away from itself and towards another situation, another enemy.  
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